senior project

With this issue of The Forum, we are introducing a new section featuring an
exemplary senior project by a recent graduate. A requirement of every Cal
Poly graduate with a B. A. in History, this two-quarter, culminating experience
permits advanced students to “do history” in ways that more closely reflect their
own intellectual interests and passions. The objective of senior project is to
produce an essay or creative project that makes optimal use of the knowledge
and skills advanced history students have acquired during their academic career.
Combining the examination of primary sources with secondary interpretations,
the completed project should reflect extensive research, astute analysis, and
careful presentation.
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CONSTRUCTING IDENTITY IN A POST-WAR WORLD
Elizabeth Metelak

“The Council of Lithuania, as the sole representative of the
Lithuanian nation, based on the recognized right to national
self-determination, and on the Vilnius Conference’s resolution
of September 18–23, 1917, proclaims the restoration of the independent state of Lithuania, founded on democratic principles,
with its capital in Vilnius and declares the termination of all state
ties which formerly bound this State to other nations.”1
On February 16, 1918, the Tarbya, or Council of Lithuania, signed the above
Act of Independence of Lithuania, declaring the restoration of Lithuania as an
independent state after centuries under Prussian and Russian imperial rule, and
setting off more than a decade of regional conflict concerning what this could
and should mean for Lithuanians and their neighbors. Although occupying
German forces initially suppressed this document, ensuring a pointed lack of
immediate results, the tides of war gradually bestowed the Tarbya’s words with
more than mere symbolism. Even before Germany formally surrendered, the
1
Lietvos Tarbya, “Lietuvos Nepriklausomybės Aktas” in “Historical Lithuania,” Vilnews.com,
last modified 14
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Lithuanian Constituent Assembly had authored a provisional constitution,
and Lithuanians celebrated Armistice Day less than two weeks later with the
establishment of the first government of an independent republic of Lithuania.
Relying on the democratic principles espoused by the victors of World War
One and the promises of Wilson’s Fourteen Points, Lithuanian leaders forged
ahead on the path to self-determination, immersing themselves in the tasks of
designing and implementing a functioning government that corresponded to
their understandings and expectations of a Lithuanian state. Within no time
at all however, these leaders found their plans and definitions challenged on
nearly every front. Within Lithuania itself, political parties old and new, from
Christian Democrats and Populists to Social Democrats, Communists, and
National Unionists, each struggled to ensure that their agenda took precedence
in the newly formed state. Outside the government, Lithuania’s various ethnic,
religious, class, and occupational groups engaged in their own conversations
about independence and the new Lithuania.
External interpretations and agendas for the Lithuanian region also developed in the massive international realignment that characterized the end of the
war. Despite the Allied victors agreement on the need for self-determination
in post-war Europe from an ideological standpoint, many powers delayed official recognition of the new Lithuanian state as unimportant, asserting a need
for additional evidence prior to considering the case. They demanded that the
Lithuanian government prove in some way that they in fact held any sort of
historic or ethnographic claim to lands and people contained within the borders
of the new state. The fledgling League of Nations, suddenly responsible for
determining the status of would-be states, excluded Lithuania from membership
on the grounds that the United States already refused to recognize Lithuania.
The United States, at the time embroiled in a frenzy of anti-communist hysteria
known as the Red Scare, justified its refusal as an unwillingness to acknowledge
the new Communist government of Russia and the loss of Russia’s imperial
prerogatives to Lithuanian lands.
In this period of uncertainty, several of Lithuania’s neighbors saw the opportunity to make their own claims concerning the nature of the Lithuanian
state. The Red Army invaded in November 1918, seeking to reclaim lands once
considered part of the Russian Empire. A group of German military adventurers
also took up arms against Lithuania in hopes of preserving German influence
in the region. Hot on their heels, newly independent Poland swept in from the
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southeast as part of a grand offensive against the Russian army. In the process,
they unashamedly occupied Lithuania’s capital at Vilna, and claimed over a
third of Lithuanian territory as its own.
Given the lasting impact of this period on future political developments
and diplomatic relationships, the dearth of academic analysis on this region
proves particularly disappointing and problematic. This partially stems from fifty
years of Soviet occupation that limited scholarly access to materials concerning
Lithuania, and also discouraged public discussions and displays of nationalism
within Lithuania itself. Most studies that even mention the formation of the
Lithuanian state do so briefly or within an analysis of the Baltic States as a
group.2 Moreover, authors tend to frame the 1910’s and 1920’s in light of the
1990’s round of independence, a mere blip within the more general story of
occupation and oppression finally shaken off in 1991. Not until recent years
have a few more-informed studies of this topic emerged, mostly by Lithuanian
citizens or expatriates, indicating continued lack of interest toward the region
among the majority of scholars (and the world at large).
In Alfred Senn’s exploration of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict and its relationship to Western powers, he blames the situation’s lack of resolution on the
ignorance of the Western Allies concerning Eastern Europe’s nationalist trends
and their inability to engage Poland and Lithuania as two sovereign nations.3
For Senn, this combination of condescension and incomprehension drastically
crippled the League of Nations’ and Entente Powers’ abilities to act decisively
or effectively in Lithuania, to the detriment of the young Lithuanian state.
Unfortunately, Senn refuses to engage the Polish perspective in his analysis because he perceived it as less meaningful than Lithuania’s. Meanwhile, Zigmantas
Kiaupa eschews any detailed analysis of the League, and focuses instead on the
military conflicts that plagued Lithuania’s early years, and their influence in
shaping the political structure of the state.4 Both these studies suffer however,
from the innate nationalist sentiments of their own authors, adopting Lithuania’s
historic enemies as their own and failing to address conflicting viewpoints
objectively. This paper seeks to remedy these deficiencies by creating a more
2
For example, John Hiden and Patrick Salmon, The Baltic Nations and Europe: Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania in the Twentieth Century, (London: Longman, 1991).
3
Alfred Erich Senn, The Great Powers, Lithuania, and the Vilna Question: 1920-1928, (Leiden:
E.J. Brill, 1966), ix.
4
Zigmantas Kiaupa, The History of Lithuania, (Lithuania: baltos lankos, 2002), 240-258.
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complete and multi-dimensional analysis concerning the formative years of the
first Lithuanian Republic. Moreover, it will attempt to draw further conclusions
concerning the creation and interpretation of Lithuanian national identity as
a multi-directional discourse between Lithuania and other entities.
Over the first years of the new state’s existence, Lithuanians expelled the
Russian and German troops, and held off further advances by the Poles, while
presenting and re-presenting their case for existence and certain prerogatives
to the League of Nations and individual national governments. Set upon
on all sides, and desperate for acceptance as a legitimate European state, the
Lithuanians compiled mountains of historic, ethnographic, and linguistic
evidence to support their right to exist and to claim certain territories. Given
the intensely nationalistic rhetoric surrounding nearly every aspect of the First
World War, it comes as no surprise that this evidence would ultimately outline
Lithuania’s own equally intense brand of national identity. More importantly,
however, these interactions created a vast international dialogue concerning the
nature and identity of the Lithuanian state that reached far beyond Lithuania’s
disputed borders. This dialogue engages a wide variety of speakers in complex
issues of democracy, national identity, and self-determination, both within
the Lithuanian state and without. Ultimately, these players have as much, if
not more, impact on the nature of the Lithuanian State as the Lithuanians
themselves, and it is this dialogue that truly shapes the strength and character
of Lithuania’s national identity.
While a significant number of new nations, states, and combinations thereof,
emerged from the chaos of the First World War, and the international community devoted significant time and energy to each case, this paper restricts
itself to issues of Lithuanian national identity and statehood, except where
other cases (such as Poland) play a direct role in Lithuanian development. This
approach does not seek to belittle the efforts of other groups or organizations in
this process, but rather to focus on the methods, successes, and failures of one
people whose story and importance find themselves frequently overlooked in
studies of the region and period, but still hold vital historical significance for
anyone concerned with issues of national identity in the formation of states.
In its interpretation on nationalism as a multi-directional discourse, this
paper relies on people and documents from a wide range of sources, which have
been incorporated as much as possible in the scope of this work. Unfortunately
the author’s own language limitations have heavily impacted the types of sources
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consulted in the course of this research. Thus, while a few documents have
been translated from Lithuanian specifically for this paper, the majority of
sources are those originally published in English - diplomatic correspondence,
US newspaper articles, US Senate, and League of Nations documentation - or
those translated to English by Lithuanians and Lithuanian Americans for the
benefit of the international community. While these circumstances might
neglect the voice of the Lithuanian peasantry particularly, certain travelogues
serve as a vehicle for some peasant sentiments concerning Lithuania’s place in
the world at large.5 Moreover, this approach demonstrates the intricacies of the
dialogue surrounding national identity and the vast international scale within
which these conversations occur.
Due to the complexities of war and ever-shifting borders, as well as conflicting claims over Lithuanian territory and identity, many people, places, and
organizations appear under different names in different accounts. In striving
for historical accuracy, this paper incorporates the most relevant terminology
in each situation, dependent on the time period and the term used by each
particular document. Thus Lithuania’s present capital, Vilnius, may appear
as Wilno (Polish), Vilnius (Lithuanian), or Vilna (international), and certain
people’s names may appear in their Polish or Lithuanian renditions (for example)
depending on the context. These distinctions are not intended to confuse, but
to realistically reflect the language of the period and reiterate the complexities
inherent to the formation of national identity within Lithuania.
Young Nationalism: Infancy to Adolescence
Modern Lithuanian nationalism traces its roots to Lithuanians’ reactions against
growing oppression in the second half of the nineteenth century. While regional uprisings and agitations, supplemented by differences in language and
culture, fostered a level of national consciousness in many parts of Eastern
Europe, Lithuanian nationalism found its growth stunted by the region’s historic union with Poland, the Polonization of many Lithuanian elites, as well
as the region’s absorption into the Russian Empire in 1795.6 Not until Tsar
Alexander II officially abolished serfdom throughout the empire in 1861 did
5
See Peter Saurusaitis, Thirty Days in Lithuania, (Illinois: Call Printing Company, 1920), for
example.
6
Alfred Senn, The Emergence of Modern Lithuania, (New York: Columbia University Press,
1959), 4.
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nationalist sentiment in Lithuania truly develop a life of its own.7 1861-1862
saw widespread demonstrations by Lithuanian peasants angry at delays in
emancipation, followed by a joint Polish-Lithuanian uprising in 1863. The
tsar’s harsh dealings with the Uprising led to a general decline in the power
of the Lithuanian gentry, who suffered land confiscations and heavy fines for
their involvement. Alexander II and his son’s ensuing policies of Russification
restricted the use of Lithuanian language, the practicing of Catholicism, and
otherwise limited Lithuanian politics and culture.
The same agitations that set Lithuanians at odds with their Russian masters
ultimately severed ties with their Polish brothers-in-arms as well. The paths of
the two peoples converged in the fourteenth century through the marriage of
their two sovereigns, the Lithuanian Grand Duke Jagiela and the Polish queen
Jadwiga, to form a kingdom that stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea.
Lithuanians claim that in 1569, the Polish coerced Lithuania into a formal union
signed at Lublin that infringed upon their status as a sovereign people.8 The
Poles conversely claim that this union sprang from the mutual strengthening
of their ties and that it brought unity and culture to the Lithuanians.9 Over
time, much of the Lithuanian gentry adopted Polish language and culture,
leaving Lithuanian peasants to preserve their own language and traditions, but
inadvertently blurring the lines between the two cultures more than replacing
either. Authors like the poet Adam Mickiewicz wrote proudly of the Lithuanian
fatherland, but referred to the Polish Litwa rather than the Lithuanian Lietuva.10
Even in Vilna, Lithuania’s historic capital, one could hear far more Polish or
even Yiddish spoken in the streets than Lithuanian, making the city a source
of contention until the end of the Second World War.
Over time, a small Lithuanian intelligentsia emerged, striving to reestablish
the language and culture that had fallen out of use among the educated under
Polish influence. The region found itself divided, at times so much that one
brother might identify as Polish while another declared himself Lithuanian. The
1863 Uprising brought these tensions to the forefront as Polish and Lithuanian
7
Kiaupa, 183-188, Thomas Balkelis, The Making of Modern Lithuania, (London: Routledge,
2009), 10
8
“A Historical Survey of Lithuania, The Lithuanian-Polish Dispute, (London: Eyre and
Spottiswoode, Ltd., 1921), 5.
9
Poland and Lithuania: The Question of Wilno, edited by the Society “Straż Kresowa,” (Warsaw:
IMPR Galewski and Dau, 1921), 7-8.
10
Mickiewicz, Adam, Pan Tadeusz, trans. by Leonard Kress, HarrowGate Press, 2006), 5.
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aims for the rebellion diverged drastically. Polish leaders spoke of Lithuania
as a territory of Poland, while many Lithuanian leaders viewed the uprising as
an opportunity to pull away from the Poles and restore Lithuanian autonomy.
These conflicting viewpoints led to irreparable divisions between the Polish
and Lithuanian nobilities in their plans for the uprising and the future of the
region. Such radically different interpretations of the region’s history and culture sparked massive conflict that continued unabated and unresolved despite
larger conflicts with the Russian and German Empires and even as younger
generations of Poles and Lithuanians began to develop new forms of nationalism within their respective cultures.11
Thomas Balkelis traces the origins of this new Lithuanian nationalism to an
emerging intelligentsia born from the imperial Russian education system and
subsequent exposure to Russian intellectual culture.12 As increasing numbers
of Lithuanian students graduated from Russian universities and began seeking
employment, many of them found work as doctors, lawyers, and teachers, and
made their way into Lithuania’s Polish and Jewish dominated cities for the first
time. In Balkelis’ estimation, cities like Mariampol and Vilna became centers
of patriotic activity, while other members of the intelligentsia assimilated into
Russian culture or else took refuge abroad.13 These increasingly secular urban
intellectuals orchestrated the creation of illegal patriotic publications like Aušra
(Dawn) and Varpas (The Bell) that allowed them to voice their nationalist sentiments and political agendas in the now-banned Lithuanian language. This
defiance however, required time to bridge the gap between the city and the
country, between the wealthy and the peasants. An urban middle class grew
slowly and painfully as professionals from peasant backgrounds struggled to
adjust their way of life.14 By the turn of the century, this group, while by no
means cohesive, had somewhat consolidated political leadership within a covert
Lithuanian nationalist movement.15 Unfortunately, this movement’s discussions
and actions remained disconnected from society at large.
Lithuanians only began to remedy this breach with the outbreak of revolution across the Russian Empire in 1905. Massive unrest within the peasant
Kiaupa, 187-188.
Balkelis, 12.
13
Balkelis, 24.
14
Balkelis, 38-39.
15
For a more in-depth discussion of this period, see Thomas Balkelis’ detailed analysis of the
Lithuanian intelligentsia in The Making of Modern Lithuania.
11
12
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and labor populations ignited a fire of political unrest at every level of society
within the imperial context. Emboldened by the actions of the lower classes,
underground political leaders throughout the land also arose in opposition to
the tsar’s autocratic government with calls for representation and democracy.
Lithuania proved no exception to this case. Workers’ strikes and agricultural
demonstrations demanded social equities long denied to the lower classes, jolting Lithuanians into action on every level while also providing an audience
with which political leaders could share their agendas. While the Lithuanian
intelligentsia welcomed such opportunities to promote national consciousness,
they proved tremendously unprepared to harness the energies of the peasants
and workers.16 Hopelessly divided amongst themselves, various political parties broached numerous resolutions designed to end the conflict and secure a
permanent peace, but achieved little in the way of unifying the movement.
Despite the lack of political unity in this moment, a 1919 publication
recalls that in 1905, “the national consciousness in Lithuania was so strong
and widespread, throughout the land that it was possible to call a convention
from all parts of Lithuania.”17 As Lithuanians gathered for the convention then
known as the All-Lithuanian Assembly, now referenced as the Grand Seimas,
the nationalist movement began to coalesce into something far greater than
fragmented pockets of political elites.18 The congress met in late November,
with roughly 2,000 delegates covering topics from autonomy to education
to agriculture, and eventually settling on a rather ambitions program for the
unification and improvement of Lithuanian society. This event also ushered
a greater number of common people into the political arena than ever before,
forming a mass movement where only elites had agitated formerly. This drastic
shift in participation found the people of Lithuania increasingly invested in
the formation of a Lithuanian nation and brought them one step closer to a
coherent national identity.
Although the Revolution of 1905 petered out without truly democratizing
the empire, the establishment of the Duma, an empire-wide representative
assembly announced by Nicholas II’s October Manifesto, sparked significant
interest within Lithuania. The same concessions granted Lithuanians increased
Balkelis, 38.
Kunigas Antanas Jusaitis, “The History of the Lithuanian Nation and its Present National
Aspirations,” (Philadelphia: The Lithuanian Catholic Truth Society, 1919), 79.
18
Balkelis, 59-60.
16
17
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political freedoms, including the ability to publish in their native language for
the first time in over forty years. These developments ushered in waves of new
publications, cultural, political, and otherwise, in the Lithuanian language.
Despite the Duma’s repeated dissolutions, Lithuanians actively engaged in
that forum as long as they could, before ultimately returning their focus to
Lithuanian people and lands. Lithuanian cultural work became the defining
element of these years, leading to the development and refinement of a national
culture long before the movement could propose the idea of an independent
Lithuanian state. Music, dress, and writing flourished as distinct costumes
and customs came to stand as emblems of the Lithuanian people, and spread
through the cities like fire. This cultural coherency left Lithuania far more
united than many of its nearest neighbors, eagerly awaiting the opportunities
that war would soon bring.
Growing Pains: War and Acceleration
The coming of world war rapidly accelerated the development of national
identity in Lithuania. Most scholars agree that despite (or perhaps because
of ) their own nationalist sentiments, when Germany declared war on Russia
on August 1, 1914, Lithuanians rallied enthusiastically to the tsar’s cause.19
This enthusiasm, however, appears much more opportunistic than heartfelt;
leaders in Vilna almost immediately submitted a declaration to the Russian
government in favor of combining the two Lithuanian jurisdictions and granting them autonomous status within the empire. Lithuanian political leaders
hoped that the context of war might allow them to gain political concessions
from the empire that might have otherwise gone unaddressed.20 Their “Amber
Declaration” met with a rapid, angry dismissal by the Russian government, but
such sentiments only gained momentum in Lithuania as the war dragged on.21
As these conversations unfolded, Russian and German hostilities quickly
transformed Lithuania into a warzone. Much of the early fighting during the
First World War took place not in France and Belgium, as the focus of many
19
Balkelis, The Making of Modern Lithuania, 105. Senn, The Emergence of Modern Lithuania,
18. Kiaupa, The History of Lithuania, 227. Stanley Page, The Formation of the Baltic States a Study of
the Effects of Great Power Politics upon the Emergence of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1959), 27. This was also not an unusual phenomenon across Europe in
the early months of the war.
20
Senn, Emergence, 18.
21
Balkelis, Making, 105.
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retellings seems to indicate, but in the east, where the Russian Empire and
the Central Powers swept back and forth across Poland and Lithuania in their
quests for supremacy. For those remaining in the region, the “terrible destruction caused by war” ensured that impoverishment, starvation, and displacement
became the norm.22 Forests and vegetation disappeared in the wake of powerful new artillery raids, while cities and farms burned to the ground with an
alarming frequency.23 Compounding this distress, many maps at this time, and
consequently early relief efforts, categorized Lithuania as Northern Poland,
assuming that Polish relief agencies would seek to alleviate the suffering of
this region as a matter of course. Unsurprisingly, Polish relief agencies already
struggling to address the needs of Polish war victims had little ability or desire
to stretch their resources any thinner for non-Poles (especially not their rivals
in Lithuania), leaving Lithuanians in a desperate state.24
The coming of the German occupation quickly multiplied the intensity of
suffering for the Lithuanian people, but this shift in power also ushered in new
opportunities and risks for Lithuanians. By mid-1915, Germany had taken all
of Lithuania, on into Latvia and Russia, forcing Russian officials and hundreds
of thousands of refugees to flee deep into Russian territory. The German occupational government that replaced these officials proved exceedingly harsh,
bringing inflation, a new currency, and compulsory labor to the already devastated land.25 Though bitterly oppressive, the occupation led Lithuanians to feel
increasingly empowered to act on their own behalf, able to shape Germany’s
perceptions and administration of the region in ways that the Russian Empire
had long prevented. Stanley Page elaborates on this trade-off in The Formation
of the Baltic States, as he unravels the German thought process behind actions
concerning the Eastern Front. By late 1916 and early 1917, Germany’s position in the war looked rather tenuous. Hoping to recruit desperately-needed
soldiers from their newly conquered territories, German leaders proclaimed
the Kingdom of Poland an autonomous region within German jurisdiction,
allowing the Poles a level of local authority that had long been denied provided
that they supplied soldiers for the German army.26 Such a move however, posed
“Distress in Lithuania,” New York Times, (Aug 12, 1915), 3.
Ibid., 3.
24
Ibid., 1.
25
Kiaupa, 230.
26
Page, 32.
22
23
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numerous risks to the Germans, namely that encouraging Polish nationalism
significantly weakened Germany’s grip on the region. Page believes that the
Germans’ only logical means to discourage nationalistic agitation in Poland lay
in simultaneously promoting Lithuanian nationalism, which, due to the aforementioned disputes, frequently manifested itself as anti-Polish.27 Although they
refrained from granting Lithuania autonomous standing as well, this strategy
placed the two groups at odds with one another and distracted Lithuanians
from formulating strong nationalist ideas or thoughts of independence.
While the decision to encourage two opposing nationalisms may have
sprung from Germany’s dire need to recruit able-bodied men for the front lines,
German leadership seems to have significantly underestimated the strength and
will of both movements in their calculations. Far from keeping one another in
check, the leeway granted by the German strategy quickly transformed into the
justification for subsequent demands for even greater levels of autonomy within
Lithuania. Meanwhile, Russia’s political turmoil began to take precedence over
its war effort and its leaders began considering a separate peace with Germany.
This dialogue centered primarily on the question of the German-occupied border
regions, leading Lithuanians to fear immense losses of land and authority to
the Poles in any settlement that might be reached. Poland had already (albeit
prematurely) announced their annexation of Lithuania on May 24, 1917, spurring Lithuanians to cooperate with the Germans far more than they had ever
intended.28 Lithuanians hoped that this cooperation would convince Germany
to protect the integrity of Lithuania’s borders from unwelcome Polish incursions.
In reality, German concessions stemmed far more from their own agendas than
any real concern for the Lithuanians.
Attempts to define Lithuanian borders and identity faced further obstacles
when the Bolsheviks rose to power in Russia in October of 1917. Seeking to
remove themselves from the war as quickly as possible with as little loss of territory as it could negotiate, Russia’s Communist Party entered deliberations
with the Germans at Brest-Litovsk. Through this process, the Bolsheviks clearly
demonstrated that they possessed no desire to relinquish any of the territories
belonging to the former Russian Empire. Alfred Senn notes that the Bolsheviks
almost immediately established a Commissariat of Lithuanian Affairs and began
27
28

Page, 32.
Kiaupa, 235.
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suppressing nationalist agitation among Lithuanian refugees and refugee organizations based in Moscow and Petrograd.29 Moreover, neither the Bolsheviks
nor the Germans permitted Lithuanians to join the delegations sent to the peace
talks, forcing them to agree to German authority and the restriction of all but
the most basic cultural autonomy in return for guarantees that Lithuania would
remain intact and separate from Poland.30 While one nationalist finagled his way
to the talks as an advisor to the Ukrainian delegation, the Lithuanians could
do little to directly influence the nature of the discussion.31 They continued
to meet with representatives of the German government to curry favor and
gain more favorable terms for Lithuania, but their hands remained effectively
tied throughout the conversation. This relative impotence proved short-lived,
however, when continued military aggression forced the Bolsheviks to drop all
demands and sign the Treaty of Brest Litovsk in early 1918, relinquishing their
claims to all of its now German-occupied territories. Free from the uncertainties of the peace talks, Lithuanians immediately renewed their efforts to gain
whatever autonomy the Germans would grant.
Even as they agitated within the parameters of German authority, Lithuanians
began seeing the possibility of a truly independent Lithuania rising from the
ashes of war. In January of 1918, the Lietuvos Aidas (Echo of Lithuania), a
four page daily sponsored by the Tarbya, published several articles that testify
to Lithuanians’ strong nationalist sentiments and reflect the development of
Lithuanian’s hopes for the future. On New Year’s Day, 1918, a second-page article recalled the 1905 Revolution and the Seimas that culminated in Lithuania’s
first claim of political autonomy within the Russian Empire.32 The author
hearkens back to what he considers Lithuania’s “first public protest” of its
status, lauding the fire and passion of the Seimas, which he likens to a volcano
of agitation in which the Lithuanian people finally voiced their determination
to reclaim their long-lost political autonomy.33 The article pointedly credits
the Seimas with having “convinced [the Lithuanians] that it [was] time to take
Alfred Senn, Emergence, 29.
Ibid., 29-32.
31
Ibid., 31.
32
“Atsiminimai ir įspūdžiai iš Didžiojo Vilniaus Seimos” (Remembrances and Impressions of
The Great Seimas of Vilnius), Lietuvos Aidas, trans. Kristina Petruitytė, January 1, 1918, #1(49),
p. 2-3. http://www.epaveldas.lt/vbspi/biRecord.do?biExemplarId=66475
33
Ibid., 2.
29
30

64

Elizabeth Metelak

actions and show that Lithuania [had] a right to seek its freedom.”34 By underscoring the similarities between Lithuania’s situation in 1905 and 1918, the
author indicates an avid hope to revive these sentiments within the Lithuanian
population and reawaken a “real desire to walk the country out of misery.”35
Just four days later, the front page of the Lietuvos Aidas declared to all of
Lithuania that “[an] independent and democratically organized country with
ethnological boundaries [was] needed” for Lithuanians to continue developing
as a people.36 The article referenced a 1917 conference in Vilnius in which two
hundred and twenty-two delegates had secured a general consensus to that effect
and reiterated their desire for independence to come swiftly.37 Describing these
desires as the “voice and consciousness” of the people, the author publically
incorporated statehood into the nationalist conception of Lithuanian identity.
The author also stipulated that an independent Lithuanian state required its
capital to remain in Vilnius, implicitly alluding to the city’s importance within
the Lithuanian framework and foreshadowing the coming conflicts concerning
it.38 These articles reflect the ever-growing agitation among Lithuanian leaders as
the war dragged on, a sentiment that increasingly could be heard in all corners
of Lithuania, at every level of society. While certain political groups maintained
separate agendas, the general consensus continued to grow daily among the
Lithuanian people, soon to culminate in their Declaration of Independence.39
Long Distance Relationship: Émigré Advocacy as Nationalism
While Lithuania struggled to navigate the hardships of war and negotiate their
tenuous position between Russia and Germany, people and events outside the
Baltic took an active role in shaping Lithuania’s prospects. While scholars disagree as to which groups played the most vital roles in influencing the fledgling
Lithuanian identity, expatriates, refugees, and others, particularly in the United
Ibid., 3.
Ibid., 3. While the article speaks in terms of revival, it is important to note that Lithuanians
use this terminology throughout this process. While the case for revival certainly exists, this term
is meant to justify the national movement as a continuation of the past, rather than the invention of new traditions and ideas, and therefore, more palatable to the international community.
36
“Mūsų siekiai” (Our Aspirations), Lietuvos Aidas, trans. Kristina Petruitytė, January 5, 1918,
#3(51), p.1. http://www.epaveldas.lt/vbspi/biRecord.do?biExemplarId=66492.
37
Ibid., 1.
38
“Mūsų siekiai,” 1.
39
Kiaupa, 238.
34
35

65

the forum
States rallied together on behalf of the Lithuanian people so effectively that their
significance cannot be overemphasized. Alfred Senn highlights the intellectuals
and students of Western Europe as the centre of the national movement until
1917, led by Juozas Gabrys and other members of Lithuania’s expatriated intelligentsia.40 Tomas Balkelis, on the other hand, dismisses Senn’s perspective as too
narrow, following the exploits of a few well-known leaders at the expense of the
masses.41 Instead, Balkelis credits the oft-ignored émigré population in Russia
with the highest levels of political agitation concerning Lithuanian nationalism prior to the birth of the new state. Unfortunately, this group frequently
found itself silenced by their precarious existence as refugees in the last years of
the Russian Empire.42 Heated debates in St. Petersburg at this time may have
heavily influenced the perspectives of their participants, but the refugees failed
to establish any unified platform concerning their homeland. Moreover, they
dared not publically declare themselves in favor of a wholly independent state
while receiving food and other forms of aid from a Russian government still
clinging to its hopes of restoring the Baltic region to its borderlands by the end
of the war.43 While both Senn and Balkelis make excellent points concerning
the nature and value of each camp of advocates, neither Eastern nor Western
European refugee groups could single-handedly dictate the Lithuania debate and
hope to succeed. A third segment of the Lithuanian population, LithuanianAmericans, pouring out their voices and resources on behalf of their homeland,
unquestionably influenced the character of Lithuanian nationalism and proved
vital in orchestrating the creation of a Lithuanian state. With their uniquely
American flair, these efforts helped trigger relatively positive results where so
many other national campaigns had failed (i.e. Czechoslovakia).
The Lithuanian Information Bureau underscores the significance of these
populations in the development of Lithuanian national fervor and advocacy
for a Lithuanian state. As Tomas Balkelis ironically points out, the first calls
for full Lithuanian independence came not from Lithuania proper, but from
a conference of émigrés in Bern, Switzerland in 1916.44 The conference itself
stemmed from the rigorous efforts of an organization known as the Lithuanian
Senn, Emergence, 23.
Balkelis, Making of Modern Lithuania, 107.
42
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Information Bureau, a Paris-based group founded in 1911 under the leadership
of exiled Lithuanian politician Juozas Gabrys. Designed to educate the rest of
the world on the history, culture, and present circumstances in Lithuania, the
Bureau published prolifically, distributing over fifty works in French (still the
diplomatic language of Europe) that describe Lithuanian language, customs,
and historical significance.45 Though they transferred operations to Switzerland
as war swept into France, the Bureau continued working tirelessly to draw attention to a region otherwise overlooked in an international arena dominated
by multi-ethnic empires. In response to these efforts, Lithuanian populations
across the globe took up the cause of their homeland with a fervor that could
not yet express itself in Lithuania proper.
Heavily concerned with the state of affairs in their war-torn homeland,
Lithuanians in America kept a watchful eye on the region as the war unfolded.
As early as September 1914, the Lithuanian immigrant community called
a conference, gathering representatives from as many existing LithuanianAmerican organizations as possible to consider the war’s implications for their
homeland and the appropriate course of action. The delegates rallied to the
Lithuanian cause, publishing resolutions concerning increased autonomy for
Lithuania, while establishing a National Fund for their cause, and pledging
to actively solicit the US government to aid in the protection of Lithuanian
interests.46 To further this endeavor, the conference voted to establish a branch
of the Lithuanian Information Bureau within the United States to assist in the
publication and distribution of information to support their cause. Though this
gathering highlighted a number of practical and ideological differences among
the various organizations, it galvanized the émigré population into a flurry of
activity, hoping to call attention to Lithuania’s plight.
Perhaps the most vital and ongoing role filled by Lithuanian-Americans in
the shaping Lithuanian identity lay in their thorough and persistent dissemination of information concerning their homeland and its aspirations. Their steady
stream of publications over the course of the war focused intently on stories
that provided background on the Lithuanian people or evidence with which
to strengthen the Lithuanian cause. With titles like A Plea for the Lithuanians
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and Lithuanian Booster, journals and magazines sought to enlist the interest
and assistance of as wide an audience as possible, whether that aid presented
itself in military action, peace processes, agitation for independence, or any
combination thereof. Under the guidance of the Lithuanian National Council,
the Washington D. C.-based Information Bureau rallied the United States to
the cause of independence, and counteracted any rival claims to the Lithuanian
homeland. Thus Lithuanian-Americans rapidly became Lithuania’s loudest and
most prolific defendants.47
These calls for autonomy abounded within Lithuanian-American society,
but the majority of Lithuanian émigrés initially focused their efforts on more
feasible projects addressing more immediate needs caused by the war. To that
end, the American Relief Fund for Lithuanian War Sufferers began collecting
funds to alleviate the suffering within the Lithuanian population. Already developing into Lithuania’s strongest advocates, Lithuanian-Americans flooded
newspapers with articles calling attention to events along the Eastern Front.
Many such articles point out that the German and Russian armies had swept
through Lithuania six times by August 1916 in their struggle for dominance,
but that international aid organizations had largely ignored the damage inflicted
on the now-starving Lithuanian people.48 This ignorance stems at least in part
from a widespread lack of understanding concerning the region and its people.
One article blames the error on the fact that regions of Lithuania at this time
found itself incorrectly labeled by military experts as Northern Poland, while
Polish relief organizations felt they had little reason to concern themselves with
Lithuanian refugees.49 Some Lithuanian-Americans found the misnomer highly
offensive, as one letter to the editor indignantly reclaims these territories as
distinctly Lithuanian, marked by a unique language and culture.50 Faced with
such instances of ignorance, the Relief Fund doubled its efforts, even sending
investigative teams into the Lithuanian war-zone to assess matters, and obtaining an audience with the Pope concerning the dire situation.51 This intensity of
feeling in Lithuanian-American communities merely indicates a rapid growth of
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nationalist sentiments within the Lithuanian population abroad that massively
contributed to the Lithuanian cause.
After months of urging, the Relief Fund and Lithuanian-Americans at large
convinced Congress and President Wilson to declare November 1 as Lithuania
Day, in which US citizens might “express their sympathy by contributing to the
funds now being raised for the relief of Lithuanians in the war zone.”52 Jointly
and independently, various Lithuanian-American societies raised hundreds of
thousands of dollars dedicated to the Lithuanian cause over the course of the
war. Even personal occasions like weddings became fundraising events, like one
small Chicago wedding that raised $13.25 for the Fund ($296.5 in 2012).53
Some of these funds went directly to the front lines to ease the hardships of
war, while the organizations dedicated various levels of funding to the fight
for autonomy or independence, cultural education, and diplomatic endeavors.
These numbers become significantly more impressive with the realization that
the average Lithuanian-American family made a mere $638 per year prior to
the war ($14,397.87 in 2012).54 Nor did Lithuanian-Americans’ giving end
there; when the US finally entered the war in 1917, between 30,000 to 50,000
Lithuanian Americans rushed to fill the ranks of the military.55
Financial aid and military service certainly advanced Lithuanian national
endeavors, but Lithuanian-Americans had still more to say concerning the
Lithuanian state and national identity. Realizing that Polish and Russian representatives with their own agendas for the territory had already begun spreading
their beliefs across Washington, Lithuanian-Americans saw an urgent need to
counteract any claims that did not align with their own agenda for a future
Lithuanian state.56 In the steady stream of articles aimed directly at US government agencies, politicians, and the press, the Information Bureau compiled
an extensive body of evidence in favor of Lithuanian sovereignty that came
to represent the general consensus of most Lithuanian-Americans and their
organizations.57
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A prime example of this advocacy arises in the “American Lithuanian’s
Declaration” that the Lithuanian National Council handed to President Wilson,
the Pope’s representatives, and European ambassadors in early 1917. In this
text, Lithuanian-Americans briefly outlined Lithuania’s history as a separate
nation and powerful state in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, establishing
Lithuania’s historical legitimacy on the global stage.58 The text goes on to speak
of Lithuania’s unsubdued national sentiment and desire for independence as
exemplified in peasant songs and literature, confirming that despite Russian
occupation and repression, Lithuania lived on in cultural artifacts among intelligentsia and peasants alike. Moreover, the article emphasizes the Lithuanian’s
role in the Revolution of 1905, perhaps embellishing the truth in order to win
the admiration and support of American and international leaders.59 Ultimately,
the declaration implies that granting Lithuanians their freedom would greatly
assist the international endeavor to stop the bloodshed, a claim that, while not
necessarily grounded in reality, certainly appealed to the Allied Powers’ desire
to end the war in a tidy manner. The text reflects many tactics of LithuanianAmerican advocacy that would find themselves repeated continuously in the
coming years, as well as a willingness to bluntly address even the highest levels
of leadership on behalf of a future Lithuanian state. Publications like this one
flooded the press and provide crucial insight into the evolution of Lithuanian
national identity in the eyes of Lithuanian-Americans. Moreover, these works
reiterate the vast extent to which Lithuanian-Americans weighed in on the
affairs of their homeland as war raged onward and Lithuanians pressed closer
to their goal of independence.
Obstacles to Recognition: Fighting for Acceptance in the Post-War World.
When the Tarbya published its declaration of independence, the German occupation rendered the document ineffective in any practical sense. Lithuanians
could neither form their own government, nor make their own decisions in the
diplomatic arena, and daily life changed little. Despite this lack of tangible results, Lithuanian-Americans immediately jumped to the defense of the new state
and began outlining their expectations for the direction this state should take.
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A convention of Lithuanians met in New York City in March 1918, echoing
the words of the Tarbya’s declaration as they confirmed that Lithuania existed
as a sovereign “ethnographic, cultural, economic, and political entity” based
firmly upon President Wilson’s declaration concerning self-determination.60
Although technically Lithuanian-Americans had no legal right to dictate the
requirements of the Lithuanian state, the convention went on to outline various
rights and freedoms that “citizen[s] of Lithuania […] shall enjoy,” as well as
policies concerning the nationalization of resources and commercial enterprises,
and the republican form of government to be established.61 On some level, it
seems mildly absurd that an émigré population might dictate the formation
of a new state, but the role played thus-far by the Lithuanian-American community gave them a significant amount of leverage. While the leaders and
politicians in Lithuania certainly could have ignored these voices from across
the sea, in reality, Lithuanian émigrés possessed a great deal more freedom at
the time than Lithuanians still under the German Ober Ost. These politicians
and activists owed and would continue to owe quite a debt to the work of the
Lithuanian population abroad as they waited out the end of the war, trying to
make their audacious declaration a reality. In the international arena moreover,
these declarations proved absolutely necessary for any state that hoped to earn
international recognition within the context of the war, reassuring all that they
would subscribe to democratic principles and look out for the well-being of all
their citizens so as to prevent future wars from occurring on such a horrendous
scale. Such declarations from Lithuanian-Americans served to make the idea of
an independent Lithuania as palatable as possible to the United States, which
appeared to wield increasing amounts of influence over the course of the war
and its eventual resolve.
As Lithuania’s politicians balanced precariously between the German
occupation and their assertion of independence, the Lithuanian National
Council in Washington D. C. began publishing “Facts Supporting Her Claim
for Reestablishment as an Independent Nation” to convince the world of the
validity of Lithuania’s declaration, and solicit the aid of the so-called Great
Powers in this process.62 The pamphlet served as a template for many subsequent
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documents, briefly outlining the territories that Lithuanians intended to include
in their new state and reiterating their linguistic distinctions, before delving
into a shortened version of Lithuanian history from the thirteenth century
onward. Interestingly, the pamphlet refers to the outbreak of war in 1914 as an
untimely interruption of a Lithuanian national revival and the people’s efforts
towards independence, despite more recent scholarship to the contrary.63 Prior
to the war, Lithuanian nationalism had not yet achieved a level of coherency
needed to consider statehood, much less view it as an inevitable reality. In
fact, most scholars concur that the war played a vital role in accelerating the
development of national identity in Lithuania. In light of this contradiction,
the Lithuanian National Council’s claims reflect overconfidence at best, and
utter delusion at worst, but this reflects just how fervent Lithuanian nationalism had become within the émigré population of the United States. After all
the rallies, all the publications, and all their efforts on behalf of the homeland,
Lithuanian-Americans genuinely believed that their brothers would have secured
their liberty even sooner without the war. Present perspectives may discount
such ideas, but the pamphlet’s approach still appears logical as the words of a
national movement justifying its claims for an independent state. If Lithuania
had made its way to the brink of liberation prior to the war, then how could
anyone deny them their freedom after much suffering and delay? Although
the council could not have predicted it, the text also handily preempts many
complaints that smaller national groups greedily demanded far more than they
could reasonably claim. If Lithuania could prevent itself from falling into such
categories, then the Great Powers (and subsequently the League of Nations)
might treat their national agenda with more care and respect.
As World War One petered towards the armistice in 1918 and German
power waned, Lithuanians finally began developing an independent state for
themselves and those minorities that chose to remain under their jurisdiction.
The tasks of formulating their new government and continuing to appeal for
international recognition of their infant state consumed their efforts. Lithuanians
all over the world had struggled and petitioned for this moment for years, but
the end of the war brought unprecedented opportunities for Lithuanians to
define themselves and their homeland. With this freedom, however, came the
massive responsibility of outlining a Lithuanian identity that the majority of
63
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the world both inside and outside Lithuania would also find acceptable. Faced
with a seemingly insurmountable task, the Lithuanian leadership strove to form
a government based on the principles of democracy that the new global leaders
held as the standard (at least in Europe). As part of this process, the Tarbya
established a provisional government headed by Augustinas Voldemaras as
prime minister, and a Council and Cabinet of Ministers to serve as the executive
branch until a Constituent Assembly could be called to hammer out the finer
points of state. Moreover, Lithuania began sending out envoys to its nearest
neighbors, and gathering delegations to attend the Paris Peace Conference,
where they hoped to persuade the world to acknowledge their existence. As if
to combine forces, delegations from the new Lithuanian government and from
Lithuanian-Americans converged at the conference to convince the world of
their legitimacy. While they failed to gain any direct acknowledgement, one
paragraph of the resultant Treaty of Versailles did allow the provisional governments in all three of the Baltic States to take any necessary measures to defend
against the spread of Bolshevism.64 This indirect sort of acquiescence, however,
still denied Lithuania the official status of statehood, and restricted the forms
of aid that other states could or would give.
Although Lithuanians may not have appreciated this struggle, the ongoing fight for recognition forced Lithuanians to really articulate their agenda,
how they perceived themselves, and what they wanted as a long term political
entity. Since much of Eastern Europe saw the end of the war as an opportunity to spring free of Russian dominion and German occupation in one fell
swoop, the quest for recognition developed not just among Lithuanians and
Lithuanian-Americans. In September, 1919, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians
and Ukrainians in the United States banded together in order to present their
cases jointly. In this congress, the four nationalities argued that their children
had helped the US in their fight to end autocratic governments and oppression, and that they, as representatives of three million Americans, desired their
adopted country to extend a hand of warmth and friendship to their beloved
homelands.65 The joint congress reiterated the similarity of ideals between their
homelands and the US, while emphasizing the United States’ line that World
Kučas, 172.
The Case of the New Republics of Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine, presented at the
First Congress of the League of Esthonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and Ukrainians of America, (New
York, 1919), 7.
64

65

73

the forum
War One had occurred so that these peoples too might enjoy the democracy
and liberty that so embodied the war in American minds.66 This combined
effort underscores that Lithuania by no means stood alone as a young nation
begging for international blessings to progress with the formation of a new state.
These fledgling movements profited greatly from such US-based alliances when
addressing international leaders, either individually or as the League of Nations,
despite the fact that such alliances did not often exist in the European sphere.
While such efforts may have convinced other leaders however, it seems that in
most cases, the United States refused to budge.
On September 25, 1919, Great Britain became the first of the Great Powers
to recognize Lithuania as an independent state, while Lithuania’s nearest neighbors soon followed suit.67 For Britain, recognition came out of the practicalities
of the post-war environment. Fearing the spread of Bolshevism outward from
Russia’s borders, Britain saw the entire Baltic region as a potential barrier to
further Bolshevik expansion. By recognizing Lithuania, the British could assist in the struggle against the Bolsheviks and thus protect the rest of Europe
from the fearful specter of Communism.68 While perhaps more utilitarian than
springing from conviction, this decision dramatically benefited the Lithuanian
national cause. British recognition ignited a wave of other recognitions for an
independent Lithuania, ranging from France to Sweden and even Argentina.69
The United States, however, continued to deny the legitimacy of a Lithuanian
state for a significantly longer period, much to the dismay of Lithuanians on
both sides of the Atlantic.
Obstacles Part II: Convincing the Americans
Lithuanian efforts to obtain official American approval continued to construct
and solidify the textures and appearances of the Lithuanian state and what it
meant to be a Lithuanian, relying on a combination of history, ethnography,
and constant comparisons of themselves and their new state with longstanding
American principles and explicitly stated war aims. The Lithuanian Review, a
publication of the Lithuanian Information Bureau, outlined “Three Reasons
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why Americans should Recognize Lithuania” that help illustrate the developing
Lithuanian identity. According to the article, the United States should recognize Lithuanian sovereignty first and foremost because it falls in line with “the
declared American war aims of ethnic self-determination for racially distinct
groups.”70 The section firmly asserts Lithuania’s racial distinctness and chidingly reminds readers that American opinion aligned with Lithuanian desires
and that ignoring racial differences in the Balkans helped spark the war in
the first place. By bluntly reminding their adopted country that these issues
played a role in dragging the world into war, Lithuanian-Americans cleverly
hinted that recognition would help prevent future conflict and allow the US
to return to its own affairs. Secondly, the article reminds Americans of their
own struggle for statehood, recalling their contribution to that cause in the
person of General Tadeusz Koscuiszko (despite Polish claims to the contrary),
and favorably comparing American liberties to those sought by Lithuanians in
the post-war world.71 How could the United States deny Lithuanians the right
to their own state when all they wanted were the freedoms and traditions that
the US had once fought so hard to gain and defended fiercely ever since? The
article’s third reason manipulates American and international desires to never
experience another war like the one that had just torn Europe apart, claiming
that an independent Lithuania would stand against Germany as it had already
done and that such efforts more than amply justified recognizing Lithuanian
independence.
Unfortunately for the Lithuanians, this last justification failed to hold
up under any level of scrutiny within the international situation in 1919. In
reality, Lithuania had collaborated closely with the Germans in the last years
of the war as other options had failed them and the new state still found itself
heavily dependent on Germany in the initial post-war era. As long as other
powers refused to acknowledge Lithuania’s existence, Germany became one of
the few venues through which Lithuanians could voice their opinions in an
international forum, and German troops remained in Lithuania long after the
war’s end. Moreover, international politics had shifted greatly with the rise of
the Bolsheviks, transforming Russia into a greater source of anxiety than the
heavily punished Germans. As long as the threat of socialism hung over Europe,
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the United States in particular seemed willing to support Germany so long as
it held back the Bolsheviks, while Lithuania mattered little either way. This
error in calculation reveals that despite his fervor, the aforementioned article’s
author could not quite grasp the new international balance of power, particularly
concerning Germany and Russia.
Advocates of Lithuanian recognition in the US repeatedly relied on American
policies and historical traditions in order to persuade US officials to grant their
blessing to the Lithuanian experiment of statehood. One memo pulls quotes
from James Buchanan, Woodrow Wilson, and Secretary of State Lansing that
remind US leaders of the long-standing US policy of support for self-determination.72 A 1921 letter to then-Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby, blames US
policies, refusing to acknowledge the fall of the Russian Empire for the delay in
recognition.73 As long as the US held out hope that the tsars would return, its
diplomatic branch refused to consider any changes to Russia’s former territories, a move that certain American lawyers, statesmen, and experts considered
extremely counterproductive. As William McAdoo, Herbert Adams Gibbons,
and Walter M. Chandler cautioned in their letter, doing nothing in hopes that
the former Russian Empire would reemerge left non-Russian borderlands such
as Lithuania vulnerable to the spread of Bolshevism, a move that certainly
could not benefit the United States long term.74 These gentlemen also warned
that tensions between the Poles and Lithuanians over Vilna and other border
disputes might lead Europe into war again, a dismal prospect for anyone hoping that World War One had literally been the war to end all wars. The fact
that the League of Nations refused to allow Lithuania to join due to the US
attitude toward the young nation only fortified these fears, since this meant
that no major power would actively interfere in the event of Polish-Lithuanian
aggression.75 Lithuanian-Americans and their allies actively pointed out such
problems in hopes of convincing the United States of what they considered a
dire need for action concerning their homeland. They bombarded US officials
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with proof of other countries that had already granted recognition to Lithuania
as if the sheer volume of these memos would convince them to change their
minds. Another approach included a detailed analysis of Lithuania’s economic
status in which the author presented various statistics for education, agriculture,
industry, and the financial sector, as if proving Lithuania’s economic viability
would convince the United States to actually recognize its independence.76
Even after the League of Nations admitted Lithuania as a member, the
United States continued to stall, as if waiting would somehow force the issue
to disappear. While one might speculate that America’s Red Scare and rampant
phobia of Bolshevism forced the United States to insist on the sovereignty of a
dead Russian empire, a realistic analysis of the situation reveals very little in the
way of logic that justifies US action or rather inaction in this situation. When
Secretary of State Hughes finally announced US recognition for Lithuania on
July 25, 1922, he provided no substantial reasons for his delay outside of the
Russian factor, and seemed resigned only because so many other nations had
already done so. With this announcement, Lithuania finally attained a measure
of security in knowing that none of the Great Powers questioned their right to
existence any longer.77
On the Map: Defining and Defending Lithuania’s Borders
In striving to prove Lithuania’s historical and cultural rights to the land in such
a way that neither Russia, Germany, Poland, nor anyone else could contradict,
Lithuanians on both sides of the Atlantic faced the enormous problem of drawing territorial boundaries that would prove acceptable to both the Lithuanian
population and the greatest number of European states possible. In a Lithuania
that had existed under foreign occupation for more than a century, borders had
been drawn and redrawn according to the policies of the Russian Empire and
the fortunes of war. Alfonsas Eidintas, Vytautas Žalys, and Alfred Erich Senn
illustrate that when Lithuanians everywhere found themselves faced with the
sudden potential to outline their own borders, they lacked any definite blueprint
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from which to begin.78 In undertaking the design of a new state, Lithuanians
struggled to choose between the lands once ruled by their ancestors, all the
lands Lithuanians had ever inhabited, or lands where Lithuanians lived in the
present.79 This choice between the historic and variations on the ethnographic
became even further complicated by the reality that other states, as well as
internal nationalities might dispute any of these claims. A somewhat vague
and unhelpful answer to this problem came about when President Wilson
agreed to form a committee for the sole purpose of investigating the Lithuanian
question in May 1918. “’Ask for the most, but always have proof that it truly
belongs to you,’” advised the committee’s chairman, Harvard professor Frank A.
Golder.80 Although Golder went on to detail certain regions and ethno-religious
backgrounds that could logically be included, this statement underscores the
complexity of the task facing the Lithuanians. Exactly where and how much
land could they carve out of Europe to meet the needs of a Lithuanian state,
while maintaining the legitimacy of those claims?
Even as Lithuanians wrestled with these questions, external forces began
to impose their own interpretations upon the region, challenging not only
specific aspects of the process, but the entire legitimacy of a Lithuanian state.
Foremost of these challenges came from Bolshevik Russia, which despite being
enveloped in its own civil war, increasingly desired to retain the borders of the
former Russian Empire as its own. Almost immediately after the armistice
took effect across Europe, the Bolsheviks reneged on the terms of the Treaty
of Brest-Litovsk and launched a full scale invasion of the still army-less infant
republic. Though some German troops remained in the region at the time,
they and their Lithuanian counterparts proved unable to ward off the invasion,
sending Lithuanian leaders fleeing the capital in order to preserve their young
government. Local socialists welcomed this invasion with open arms, and in
February 1919, the Bolsheviks set up their own government in Vilna under
the jurisdiction of the Soviet Republic of Litbel, a quasi-state that combined
both the names and territories of Lithuania and Belorussia.81 Meanwhile, most
Lithuanians rallied to defend their republic, bolstered by high hopes and the
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new government’s promises of land reform to a population dominated by
peasants.82 A clever diplomatic move by Lithuania’s new leaders, this promise
ushered in droves of peasant volunteers, giving them a tangible reason to invest
in the future of the young state and fight in its defense. By the summer of 1919,
a combination of German, Lithuanian, and Polish armies had neutralized the
government of Litbel, forcing the Soviets to negotiate peace. The treaty signed
in July 1920 reestablished desirable Lithuanian borders (for the Lithuanians)
and relinquished all Soviet claims on Lithuania’s people or resources.83 Overstretched by civil war and a badly damaged economy, the Soviets proved unable
to enforce their version of Lithuania upon the region, while their failure only
seemed to validate the existence of a Lithuanian state and inject Lithuanian
nationalism with even greater enthusiasm.
The Vilna Conflict
As the Lithuanians successfully fought off the Soviets and rogue German forces
known as the Bermondtists, their long-standing conflicts with the Poles came
to a head under the pressures of the two groups’ diverging conceptions for the
future of the region, and posed serious setbacks to Lithuanian nationalism and
its definitions. As previously discussed, Russian policies had fostered opposing
nationalisms in the region as a means of keeping Polish ambitions in check, but
neither people agreed to Russian perceptions of nationality or territory. The
same issues that had undermined the 1863 Uprising only grew more pressing
as Polish troops under the command of Józef Piłsudski crossed into Lithuanian
lands under the pretext of fighting off the Soviets. The Russo-Polish War, supported by Western powers as a challenge to the spread of Bolshevism, bought
Lithuanians time to muster their own armies against the Soviets, but also nullified many stipulations of the Soviet-Lithuanian peace treaty before the ink had
even dried. The Poles, not the Lithuanians, forced the Soviets from Vilna before
settling in, reclaiming the city as their historic right, with the intention of using
it as a jumping off point to reclaim territory that they perceived as rightfully
Polish. The ensuing conflict sheds light on the processes through which both
groups presented their definitions of Lithuania and how Lithuanians dealt with
Eidintas, Žalys, and Senn, 36-37.
“Treaty of Peace between Lithuania and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic,” July
12, 1920, in The USSR-German Aggression Against Lithuania, (New York: Robert Speller and Sons,
Publishers, Inc, 1973), 68-81.
82
83

79

the forum
the these developments in the international arena.
Incensed over the loss of their capital, but militarily too weak to launch a
counterattack, Lithuanians’ vocal complaints dragged the League of Nations
into the issue, forcing both parties to defend their claims to the city. To this end,
the Lithuanian Delegation published a book concerning the “Lithuanian-Polish
Dispute” complete with maps, drafts of protocols and agreements between
the two parties, presenting the same historical narrative used during the independence and recognition debates. While initially factual, the documents
quickly escalated to accusations of carefully planned deception on the part of
the Poles. One section blasts the Poles for negotiating a peace agreement in
1920 only to move troops into Vilna a mere two days later.84 Another section
claims that the League of Nations only involved itself in the issue after Polish
leaders falsely accused the Lithuanians of cooperating with the Bolsheviks and
instigating the aggression between the two peoples.85 In reality, Lithuanians
lacked solid factual support for their claims to the city, but Poland’s blatant
dishonesty and naked aggression in war-weary Europe pushed the League to
protect Lithuania from further incursions. To this end, the League established
a new border between Poland and Lithuania called the Curzon Line, which
Piłsudski promptly defied by moving his troops into territory that the League
had just explicitly recognized as Lithuanian. Unfortunately for Lithuanians,
the League preferred to preserve more widespread peace than try to physically
enforce their decisions and risk another massive war.
Once again, Lithuanian-Americans led the way in defending their homeland’s burgeoning identity, going to great lengths to persuade their new country
to stand against Polish aggression. In the Lithuanian National Council’s pamphlet Lithuania Against Poland: Appeal for Justice, they couched their requests
in language both flattering and familiar to the United States, drawing subtle
parallels between Lithuania’s situation and US history while relying on lofty
ideals to which they believe the US has long subscribed. The pamphlet established Lithuania as the underdog in the situation, set upon by the “numerically
stronger power” of Polish forces, and favorably compared Lithuania to the
United States’ own early history.86 The authors further relied on US sympathies
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when they reminded the president that they had only fled Lithuania to escape
Russian despotism, now replaced by Polish despotism in their minds. Given
the US entanglement in its own Red Scare at the time, they tactfully reminded
the US government that Lithuanian had taken up arms against Bolshevik
forces, thus creating a sense of political solidarity between the two states and
strengthening their plea for aid. Moreover, they expressed their appeal in terms
of what “American citizens believe,” implying that their requests stem from
the sense of justice instilled in them by their ties to the United States.87 They
claimed that a US failure to get involved would constitute a failure to live up
to its own principles of justice and fair play. Ignoring the fact that the US had
neglected to even acknowledge Lithuanian sovereignty almost two years after
they declared independence, Lithuanian Americans felt that their new nation
had a moral obligation to come to the aid of their homeland and had no qualms
about saying so.
The Poles, however, did not merely entrench themselves within the disputed
capital and dare Lithuania to come unseat them. They too compiled evidence
to justify their actions, often directly contradicting the Lithuanian account. A
Polish historical journal compiled its own collection of articles geared toward
what it terms “The Question of Wilno.”88 The first article traces Polish influence
within Lithuanian culture, from religion, literature, language, and the nobility. Its author claims that Lithuanians owe the Poles for Catholicism, for the
educated members of its population, and a plethora of cultural developments,
thereby concluding that all of Lithuania should fall under Polish jurisdiction.
The second article, however, directly engages the questions surrounding the city
of Vilna, claimed by Lithuania as its historic capital, and by Poland as a vital
cultural center. Reciting the same tale of the Lithuanian-Polish Union used by
Lithuanians to field their complaints, their rendition’s subtle changes transform
the same narrative into a fairly convincing case on behalf of the Poles. Where
Lithuanians claim strict distinctions between their people and the Poles, the
Polish account finds Russian nationalization policies to blame for the lessening
of Polish influence by death, imprisonment, or deportation.89 Moreover, it cites
the German census to claim that Poles indeed held a majority within the limits
Ibid., 1.
Poland and Lithuania: The Question of Wilno, edited by the Society “Straż Kresowa,” (Warsaw:
IMPR Galewski and Dau, 1921).
89
Ibid., 20.
87
88

81

the forum
of Vilna.90 Such contradictory narratives coming from both parties called into
question both versions of history, while making it exceedingly problematic for
the League to act decisively on the matter.
As the League of Nations turned their attention to larger concerns and
the Poles settled more permanently into Vilna, everyone but the Lithuanians
accepted the de facto situation. They never once relinquished their claims to
the city, and vocalized their grievances long after the matter had dropped from
the international scene. The simplest explanation for this lies in significance of
the capital city to national identity, and by extension, Vilna’s significance to the
Lithuanian narrative. Capital cities often represent a nation and its ideals, while
also standing as a center of government and culture. Much like the burning of
Washington D.C. in the War of 1812, the loss of Vilna struck a heavy blow to
Lithuanian morale, perhaps all the heavier for its richer history. The city, from
which their forefathers had ruled what had formerly been the largest contiguous
empire in Europe, appeared time after time in the Lithuanian narrative—as
the home of the great Duke Gediminas, the place where Lithuanians were first
baptized into Christianity, and where educated nationalists had moved to share
ideas and foment on behalf of a Lithuanian nation.91 Despite its relatively small
Lithuanian population, Vilna represented the heart and soul of the Lithuanian
nation. The Lithuanians could not forgive the Poles for snatching Vilna from
their grasp; indeed, their anger over the lost city and its surrounding territory
kept them locked in a state of war with Poland until 1938.
From their precarious and less-recognized position, however, Lithuanian
leaders lacked the manpower and international support to take the city back by
force, so it remained part of Poland until the Second World War.92 The conflict,
however, helped invest Lithuanians on both sides of the Atlantic in the fate
of their homeland. Although a setback in the Lithuanian narrative, the loss of
Vilna only solidified the nation’s borders in the collective Lithuanian imagination, borders that many hoped to one day restore even as they began addressing
more immediate problems. It strengthened ties between Lithuanian-Americans
and Lithuania so much that many returned to Lithuania—to raise families,
start businesses, and otherwise rebuild the region—while others dedicated
their efforts to travelling between the two communities and building up strong
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connections. Thus the Vilna Conflict, though a negative event in the process of
outlining a Lithuanian nation-state, bolstered Lithuanian national identity in
a way the Poles could not have foreseen. The Soviet Union quasi-restored such
imaginings, along with Vilna, after the Second World War, while the second
Lithuanian Republic solidified them in the early 1990’s.
The Memel Question
A more successful attempt by the Lithuanians to dictate the limits of their
identity arose from their fight for the port city of Memel (present day Klaipėda)
and the surrounding territory known as the Memel strip. Although the territory
contained a significant population of Lithuanians, the German administration
had placed the region within the jurisdiction of Lithuania Minor, the smaller,
Prussian-ruled entity until the end of the war. Unlike Vilna, whose significance
remained purely nostalgic in even Lithuanian minds, Memel held the promise
of prosperity for the young nation. Lacking any major port cities, Lithuanian
leaders had entered into discussions with the Germans concerning Memel as
early as 1916.93 By war’s end, Germany, and even Poland had, for various reasons,
agreed to turn over the district to the Lithuanians. Despite this, the international
community turned the territory over to Allied administration, with plans to
internationalize the city and grant Allied Powers a foothold in an otherwise
removed Eastern Europe.94 Lithuanians objected to handing Memel over to
the French and passed a resolution to join all of Lithuania Minor (including
the area surrounding Konigsberg), with the Lithuanian state. Adding to the
confusion, the territory’s population divided almost evenly into Germans and
Lithuanians, who worried about Lithuania’s economic prospects and being cut
off from Germany.
1922 found Lithuania caught in an untenable position concerning Memel.
Hoping to settle the region and guard against German and Russian ambitions,
the British offered to give Memel to Lithuania along with de jure recognition
and economic aid. In return, they expected Lithuanians to surrender Vilna to
the Poles and let the matter drop.95 As Vytautas Žalys points out, however, the
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Lithuanian government could not bend on the Vilna issue without angering
the Lithuanian people, citing an assassination attempt of an official who had
suggested negotiations with Poland previously.96 Unwilling to let the region
slip from their grasp, and spurred on by the occupation of Vilna, Lithuanian
leaders organized an uprising dominated by Memel Lithuanians, and seized
the district in December of 1922.
The Allied Powers objected strongly to such flagrant aggression, and quickly
blockaded the harbor to force the Lithuanians to back down. In the face of
the strong Allied response, the Lithuanians had no choice but to remove their
troops, but only with the promise of a renewed discussion over the fate of the
territory. Throughout the ensuing, yearlong diplomatic impasse, the Lithuanian
Information Bureau continued to play a vital role, gathering and publishing
correspondence that contextualized the issue and provided favorable evidence
supporting Lithuania’s claims and actions. In one such volume, the Bureau
claimed that Memel territory possessed a significantly higher Lithuanian
population than the Germans claimed, that the port served as a vital aspect
of Lithuania’s economic viability, and that Memel also needed Lithuanian
commerce to survive.97 The Bureau also includes documents from Prussian
Lithuanians in the district warning that Memel would be far too small to form
an economically viable free state and the people of the territory preferred a
union with Lithuania.98
The Allied Powers, predominately Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the
United States, proved much more flexible concerning Memel than the League of
Nations had with Poland, especially since many believed that giving Lithuania
Memel would make up for the as yet unresolved issue of Vilna. Even so, ironing out an agreement that both parties deemed acceptable proved exceedingly
difficult. The Lithuanian Information Bureau emphasizes the difficulties of this
process by displaying the proposed versions of the convention side by side. The
Lithuanian draft of the agreement rewrote more than half its articles, making
changes down to the smallest, seemingly insignificant details and phrasings.99
While even the smallest changes met with disapproval from the Allied Powers,
the Lithuanians clung stubbornly to the port city as rightfully their own, fighting
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tooth and nail for as many of their stipulations concerning the composition
and jurisdiction of the region as possible.100
The Lithuanians’ aggressive behavior, while seemingly abrupt and dramatic,
pointedly reflects Lithuanian leaders’ chagrin over their failure to recover Vilna,
and their stubborn refusal to lose another inch of perceived Lithuanian ground.
After two years of futilely trying to unseat the Polish presence, Lithuanians had
no intention of letting another region, one more economically vital at that, slip
from their grasp. The seizure of Memel reflects a Lithuanian adaptability to
the challenges confronting their chosen narrative. Lithuanian leaders, already
precariously balanced at the head of the new state, and under fire for the loss of
Vilna, could not afford another failure of this nature if they wished to maintain
the people’s faith in their leadership, an urgency testified to by their sudden
shift in tactics. While they had observed acceptable protocols with Vilna, and
clearly failed, Lithuanians hoped that more decisive action would force the
Allies to accept Lithuania’s version, as it had with Poland and Vilna.101 Indeed,
this route proved much more successful in obtaining the Lithuanians’ desired
results. After a year of deliberations, the 1924 Memel Convention officially
recognized the region as part of the Lithuanian State. Following another four
years of negotiations with Germany over the exact boundaries, Lithuania’s borders remained intact, encompassing Memel, lacking Vilna and the easternmost
portions of the desired territory, until the next world war rearranged Europe’s
borders once again.
Final Thoughts
In his book, Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson defines a nation as an
imagined political entity based on a perceived “deep, horizontal comradeship”
between its members.102 For Lithuania, this comradeship evolved slowly, from
a mere juxtaposition of language and geography to covert groups of disgruntled
intellectuals, and eventually, to a Lithuanian Republic. At every step of this
development, Lithuanians struggled to define themselves and gain recognition
as a unique society and culture, while competing narratives thoroughly challenged them to defend these conceptions both intellectually and militarily. The
First World War brought unprecedented opportunities to imagine a sovereign
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Lithuanian identity, bolstered by western promises for self-determination for
all peoples. Meanwhile, the Lithuanian Declaration of Independence necessitated a firm, vocal defense of this identity in the international arena, a process
that invested Lithuanians near and far in promoting the welfare of their new
national identity and its associated state.
More importantly, these processes reveal an abundance of ways in which
national identity is not only forged over imagined ties between community
members as Anderson proposes, but also through external factors and challenges not inherently found within that community. Polish, Russian, and
German antagonisms following independence forced Lithuanians to defend
a still-forming identity, adapting words and weapons to suit their needs with
equal vigor and enthusiasm. Urgently needing to articulate the essences of
Lithuanian identity and justify their claims to the Entente and the League of
Nations, Lithuanians vocalized those things that they perceived as most important in defining what made someone Lithuanian, and just where Lithuania
referred to. The debt owed to Lithuanian-Americans cannot be overstated, both
in the manner in which they besieged the U. S. government with pleas and
proposals, and in their efforts to fund refugee aid and finance the nascent state.
These factors forced Lithuanians to reimagine their history and their nation in
ways and on a scale that no prior experience had required of them. Although
the first Lithuanian Republic lasted a mere twenty-two years, the Lithuanian
identity went on to survive another world war and nearly fifty years of Soviet
occupation and deportation. It served as the foundation for the longest standing
resistance movement against the Soviets after World War Two, and again when
Lithuanians began to openly question the long-standing Soviet hegemony in
1990-91. Within a region of previously ambiguous identities, Lithuanians rallied to form a lasting identity based on real and imagined history and culture.
In a fascinating study on the formation of national identity, the Lithuanian
narrative reiterates the power of Anderson’s imagined communities in shaping
the nation and its identity, but also raises questions of exactly how such communities form and what external factors must also be taken into account.
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